SECOND DIVISION
Far East Bank & Trust G.R. No. 149589
Company,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September
15, 2006
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for
review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 49597 dated January 31, 2001 and the
resolution dated August 23, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration.[2]
Petitioner Far East Bank & Trust
Company (FEBTC)[3]
filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue an application for a tax credit/tax
refund of alleged excess payments of its gross receipts tax (GRT). FEBTC claimed it
had overpaid its GRT for the 3rd
and 4th quarters of 1994 and the entire 1995 amounting to P14,816,373.
Since no action was taken by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) on its claim, petitioner filed a case in
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) on October 18, 1996 to comply with the two-year reglementary period and avoid the prescription of its
action.[4] On July
30, 1998, the CTA rendered a decision denying the claim for lack of evidence. [5]
It appears that petitioner failed to
file its formal offer of evidence in the CTA, constraining the tax court to
rule in favor of the CIR. As explained
by the CTA:
…Its repeated
non-appearance and failure to comply with court procedures such as the filing
of a formal offer of evidence and memorandum only serve to weaken, if not put a
death knell, to its claim for refund.
The
Rules of Court is strict in considering no evidence which has not been formally
offered (Section 24, Rule 132). Without any formal offer of evidence, thus, we
could only blame the petitioner for its lost cause. Simply put, it has not
proven anything.[6]
On August 26, 1998, 22 days after its
receipt of the decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The CTA
denied the motion for being filed out of time and for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the
case to the CA.[7]
The appellate court found the petition devoid of merit. Eventually, it
dismissed the petition and affirmed the CTA decision in toto.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied. Thus,
this petition.
Petitioner urges this Court to
reverse and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. It contends that it
appended its formal offer of evidence to its motion for reconsideration in the
CTA. It now asks us to relax procedural
rules in the interest of justice.
We deny the petition and rule against
petitioner FEBTC on two points.
First, it is well-settled that the
courts cannot consider evidence which has not been formally offered.[8] Parties
are required to inform the courts of the purpose of introducing their
respective exhibits to assist the latter in ruling on their admissibility in
case an objection thereto is made.[9] Without
a formal offer of evidence, courts are constrained to take no notice of the
evidence even if it has been marked and identified.[10]
Needless to say, the failure of petitioner to make a formal offer of evidence was
detrimental to its cause.
This case does not fall within the
exception in Oñate v. Court of Appeals[11] where
the Court relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence, not formally offered,
to be considered on condition that: (1) evidence must have been identified by
testimony duly recorded and (2) it must have been incorporated in the records
of the case. In this case, “…[petitioner’s] duly
marked and identified exhibits [were] not incorporated in the records... They
are nowhere to be found.”[12]
A tax refund is in the nature of a
tax exemption which must be construed strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer.[13] To
stress, the taxpayer must present convincing evidence to substantiate a claim
for refund. Without any documentary evidence on record, petitioner failed to
discharge the burden of proving its right to a tax credit/tax refund.
Therefore, the CTA and CA correctly denied its claim.
Second, if no appeal or motion for
reconsideration is filed on time, the judgment or final order of the court
becomes final and executory.[14] Here,
the records of the case confirm that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in
the CTA was filed out of time. Petitioner
received its notice and a copy of the CTA decision on August 4, 1998.[15] Under
the rules, it had fifteen days (or until August 19, 1998) to move for
reconsideration. By the time it filed its motion for reconsideration on August
26, 1998,[16]
the decision of the CTA had already attained finality. As a final judgment, it had
by then already laid the issues to rest and the appellate courts could no
longer review it.
Courts are charged with putting an
end to controversies. In keeping with this function, judgments must become
final at some definite time fixed by law. [17]
WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 31, 2001 decision and August
23, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chairperson, Second
Division
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin–de la Cruz (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador of the Sixteenth Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, p. 24.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin–de la Cruz (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador of the Sixteenth Division of the Court of Appeals; id., p. 33.
[3] Now merged with the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
[4] Docketed as CTA Case No. 5439.
[5] Rollo,
p. 93.
[6] Supra
note 1, at 27.
[7] Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49597. Under RA 9282, the CTA was elevated to the same level as the CA. Its decisions are now appealable directly to the Supreme Court.
[8] Rules of Court, Rule 132, Sec. 34.
[9] Veran v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41154, 29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 438.
[10] Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines 392 (1998), Vol. VII, citing 5 Ency. Of Evidence 469.
[11] 320 Phil. 344 (1995).
[12] Supra note 1, at 28.
[13] Insular Lumber Co. v. CTA, 192 Phil. 221 (1981); CIR v. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corp., G.R. Nos. 83583-84, 25 March 1992, 207 SCRA 710.
[14] Feria and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated 618 (2001), Vol. I.
[15] Notice of Decision, CA records, p. 20.
[16] Motion for Reconsideration of Petitioner, id., p. 21.
[17] Ilasco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88983, 14 December 1993, 228 SCRA 413.